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Abstract 
This article re-reads representations of the self and agency in George Meredith’s The 
Egoist (1879) by drawing new connections between the novel and Victorian 
psychological theory. Critical discussions of The Egoist and psychological themes 
have rightly stressed the many ways in which, in Meredith’s novel, impersonal forces, 
biological, physiological and ideological, threaten to obliterate any notion of the self 
as discrete and autonomous. Yet Meredith maintains a strong ethical investment in 
individual agency. Comparing metaphors of fluidity, used to describe the self and 
consciousness in Meredith’s text, with similar images taken from the work of G. H. 
Lewes and James Sully, I argue that Meredith presents the self’s plasticity as crucial 
to its individuation and potential autonomy, even while that same plasticity also 
underlines the self’s vulnerability to social and ideological forces which threaten its 
independence. Clara’s individuality and agency take on distinctive political 
significance by challenging oppressive gender norms. Yet the vulnerabilities and 
bewildering complexities of individual subjective life, expressed in Meredith’s 
extravagant extensions of psychological metaphors, mean that any one self’s moves 
towards greater freedom must be fraught with uncertainty. The final part of the essay 
draws new connections between the psychological imagery that I have been exploring 
and Meredith’s engagement with human evolution. Clara’s individuation and capacity 
for autonomous action give the lie to Willoughby’s pseudo-Darwinian schematisation 
of her identity, yet the relationship between self and evolution remains a serious and 
complex issue in the novel. 
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Self, Consciousness and Agency in The Egoist 
 This essay reads George Meredith’s The Egoist (1879) in the context of late-
Victorian psychological discourse as instanced in the work of two leading scientific 
psychologists whom Meredith knew personally, George Henry Lewes and James 
Sully.
1 
Approaching Meredith’s novel in these terms, I argue, suggests the value of 
renewed attention to the concept of agency in his representations of the self. While 
some earlier studies of Meredith’s work have noted the importance of autonomous 
individual action in his ethical vision, the notion of agency has received far less 
attention in discussions of his writing in relation to contemporary psychology or 
physiology.
2
 Instead, critical accounts of Meredith’s representations of mind and 
embodiment have emphasized above all how he radically questions ideas of the self as 
discrete and active, highlighting his acute sense of the psychological and 
physiological factors which shape human beings so strongly as to threaten any notion 
of personal autonomy.
3
 For Clara Middleton, whose attempts to extricate herself from 
                                                 
1
 In a letter of September 1879 to Ida L. Benecke, Meredith approves of Benecke’s intention of 
attending lectures on ‘Mental Philosophy’ and writes that she will be better prepared 
‘if…[she]…read[s] Lewes and more particularly Bain beforehand - read them’. See The Letters of 
George Meredith, ed.by C. L. Cline, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), II, 578. Of Bain’s and 
Lewes’s work, however, it is Lewes’s highly distinctive account of consciousness and individuation 
that suggests especially close parallels with Meredith’s use of metaphor in representing these aspects of 
the self.  In an 1866 letter Meredith refers to Lewes’s Biographical History of Philosophy, which 
contains a discussion of Lewes’s theory of mind; Meredith knew Lewes personally as editor of 
Fortnightly Review when Vittoria was serialized. See Letters, I, 347, 320-1. In an 1883 letter Meredith 
refers to James Sully as a fellow ‘Sunday Tramp’, and in later years compliments him on his work on 
child psychology, the psychology of laughter and the psychology of aesthetics. See Letters, III, 1225, 
1469, 1668-69. Later, in his 1902 study An Essay on Laughter, Sully makes a number of brief 
references to Meredith’s fiction as examples of comic literature.  
2
 See Gillian Beer, Meredith: A Change of Masks (London: Athlone Press, 1970), pp. 108-09 and 
Judith Wilt, The Readable People of George Meredith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 
pp. 156-58. 
3
 See especially Nicholas Dames, The Physiology of the Novel: Reading, Neural Science, and the Form 
of Victorian Fiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Martha A. Turner, Mechanism and 
the Novel: Science and the Narrative Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), both of 
which I discuss in more detail below. Sean O’Toole places a greater emphasis on agency in 
‘Meredithian Slips: Embodied Dispositions and Narrative Form in The Egoist’, Victorian Literature 
and Culture 39 (2011), 499-524, which reads the novel in relation to twentieth-century theories of 
bodily and mental habit, and highlights the thematic importance of characters’ resistance to habituated 
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the prospect of marriage to the monstrously egotistical Willoughby Patterne form the 
central plot of the novel, the scope for autonomous action is sharply constrained by 
her gender, young age and lack of financial independence. Yet questions of agency -- 
especially Clara’s --  are nonetheless central to the novel’s exploration of how a freer 
and more equal gender politics might be achieved and, in its wake, contribute to 
Meredith’s vision of social progress. These questions are serious concerns in the 
narrative, notwithstanding Meredith’s directing our attention, in his title and in the 
‘Prelude’, to egoism as the main psychological subject-matter. 
I make the case for the importance of agency as a viable category in 
Meredith’s ethics, despite the manifold ways in which he shows that it may be limited 
in individual lives. More particularly, I argue that if we read Meredith’s 
representations of character in the context of Lewes’s and Sully’s work, the self’s 
very instability, its constant plasticity and dynamic interactions with the world, 
emerge as the source of its individuality and autonomy of action, as much as they may 
also, under other circumstances, bear witness to the self’s lack of unity and 
independence. Beyond the immediate scope of my discussion, I contend, too, that the 
examples of Meredith, Lewes and Sully, who each critically examine the mind’s 
active powers, may point to the need for a stronger focus on representations of agency 
in our wider understanding of how Victorians constructed the self. 
 
My discussion centres on a set of related metaphors of fluidity - of streams, 
currents, waves and so-on - which feature in Victorian psychological discourse and 
which Lewes and Sully use in nuanced ways in their theoretical accounts of minds’ 
                                                                                                                                            
action and thinking. My essay seeks to locate Meredith’s treatment of agency in some of its 
contemporary scientific context. 
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individuality and potential for autonomous action. Rather than present an argument 
about specific scientific influences on Meredith, though such influences must have 
played a part in his writing, I want instead to trace some of the shared psychological 
imagery to be found in their accounts and in his novel, to underline at once Meredith’s 
participation in wider psychological debate, and the distinctiveness of his 
representations of mind. Taking as my focus Clara’s struggles towards greater self-
knowledge and freedom, I argue that Meredith’s novel deploys psychological 
metaphors specifically to examine the significance of personal agency in gender-
political struggle. At the same time, his often contorted extension of these images, 
which point to the labyrinthine vagaries and paradoxes of each self, and to the equally 
maze-like interactions of self and social sphere, insist on the necessary precariousness 
of any self’s role in contributing to that political change. Liberating action must be 
highly contingent on the self who acts, with all of the potential for self-deception, or 
yielding to egoistic drives or social expectation, which such contingency implies. The 
self’s uncertain potential produces a significant difference of emphasis between The 
Egoist and Meredith’s ‘An Essay on Comedy’ (1877), with which the novel is often 
read in tandem. The Egoist bears out the ‘Essay’’s contention that genuine civilization 
makes comedy possible and is in turn shaped by comedy’s democratising impetus, 
and that neither can exist without ‘some degree of social equality of the sexes’.4  Yet 
the novel, presenting Clara as a fallible, concretely-realized character amid tangled 
social circumstance, foregrounds, much more strongly than can the ‘Essay’, the many 
psychological and social obstacles facing her attempt to assert her own equality even 
in the limited sense of choosing her marriage partner. While the ‘Essay’ insists on the 
essential parts played by individual self-knowledge and collective ‘common sense’ in 
                                                 
4
 Meredith, ‘An Essay on Comedy and the Uses of the Comic Spirit’ [1877], in The Egoist, ed. by 
Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton, 1979), pp.  431-50 (p. 441). 
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Meredith’s vision of social progress, The Egoist renders starkly the difficulty, for 
individuals, of attaining self-knowledge, and the equal difficulty of defining any such 
‘common-sense’ amid the social and ideological pressures which bear down on the 
self.
5
  If the overarching comic plot of The Egoist, in charting Clara’s attempts to free 
herself, offers an example of how individual action might contribute to social change, 
the minute local details of characterisation emphatically demonstrate that any such 
progress is beset by near-endless vacillations and reversals. One significance of 
Meredith’s notoriously ‘difficult’ style, exemplified in his use of psychological 
metaphor, is that it highlights the complex and variable role of individual agency in 
such change. 
 
As the final part of this essay will show, Meredith’s insistence on the subject’s 
inherent fluidity, and potential agency, are also crucial to the novel’s engagement with 
Darwinian discourse. A number of critical discussions of The Egoist have explored its 
evolutionary themes; the final part of this essay, though, will point to new connections 
between the novel’s evolutionary and psychological discourses, arguing that 
Meredith’s insistence on the subject’s inherent fluidity, and potential agency, is an 
important aspect of his exploration of human identity in its evolutionary context.
6
 
Clara’s complex and individuated mental dynamics contradict Willoughby’s attempts 
to classify her according to his pet quasi-Darwinian beliefs.  Nonetheless, Meredith 
suggests that if Clara is to achieve a sense of personal agency, and of herself as a 
discrete mental and physical being, she must attempt to re-connect with her own 
‘nature’ – sexual and psychological, but also evolutionary. Yet this attempt runs up 
                                                 
5
 ‘Essay’, p. 446. 
6
 See Carolyn Williams, ‘Natural Selection and Narrative Form in The Egoist’, Victorian Studies 27 
(1983), 53-79  and Jonathan Smith, ‘“The Cock of Lordly Plume”: Sexual Selection and The Egoist’, 
Nineteenth-Century Literature 50 (1995-96), 51-77. 
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against the fundamental difficulty of describing complex, fluid identity in 
evolutionary terms, despite the necessary relationship between the two. Her ‘natural’ 
self is a crucial point of reference if she is to free herself, but is highly resistant to 
definition. 
 
I. Clara’s Agency 
 
The best-known image that Lewes uses to convey his view of the mind’s 
dynamic reality is the ‘stream of consciousness.’ Both Lewes and Bain deploy the 
term from the 1850s but, as Rick Rylance has shown, Lewes’s later work in the 1870s 
pursues the metaphor in especially complex and interesting ways to represent the 
relations between conscious and subconscious experience and identity more widely.
7
 
Lewes describes how the emergence or non-emergence of any ‘excitation’, or neural 
stimulation, into the fully conscious mind is governed by its strength: 
 
There is thus a stream of Consciousness formed out of the rivulets of 
excitation, and this stream has its waves and ground-swell: the curves are 
continuous and blend insensibly; there is no breach or pause. Any increase in 
the excitability of a particular organ, or neural group, will by raising its level 
give it a relative prominence, so that for the instant it will constitute the 
consciousness. And under the incessantly fluctuating waves of special 
sensation there is the continued ground-swell of systemic [that is, internal] 
sensation, emotion, or ideal preoccupation, which from time to time emerges 
into the prominence of consciousness; and this, even when below the waves, is 
                                                 
7
 See Rick Rylance, Victorian Psychology and British Culture 1850–1880 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p. 307. 
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silently operating, determining the direction of the general current, and 
obscurely preparing the impulses which burst forth into action.
8
  
 
Lewes’s formulation here illustrates Victorian psychology’s willingness to use 
figurative language inventively. The ‘stream’ describes the ongoing dynamic between 
consciousness and subconscious mental events which lie beneath the threshold of the 
conscious mind but which can readily and rapidly become conscious; it is for this 
reason that Lewes insists on the distinction between unconscious and subconscious 
events, since these latter lie much closer to full consciousness. Extending the stream 
metaphor, Lewes describes the potential of the underlying ‘ground-swell’ of 
subconscious energies fundamentally to shape identity by directing the ‘general 
current’ and by preparing future ‘impulses’ and ‘action’, but he also insists on the 
fluidity of the interactions between consciousness and the subconscious: these 
different mental processes ‘are continuous and blend insensibly’. Implicit in this 
passage, too, is Lewes’s distinctive theory of the relationship between mind, body and 
social sphere, and this adds further layers of complexity to his understanding of the 
self as fluid and dynamic. In common with other physiological psychologists, Lewes 
insists on the inseparability of the mental and the physical, but for him this applies 
even to those neurological processes, such as those which guide reflex actions, of 
which the mind is not conscious. His view contrasts most clearly with Huxley’s 
influential argument that ‘the brain is the seat of all consciousness’ and that reflex 
                                                 
8
 George Henry Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 5 vols (London: Trübner, 1874–79), V, 366-67. 
Subsequent references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. The volumes are numbered 
thus: First Series: [I] The Foundations of a Creed (1874); [II] The Foundations of a Creed (1875); 
Second Series: [III] The Physical Basis of Mind (1877); Third Series: [IV] The Study of Psychology: Its 
Object, Scope and Method (1879); [V] untitled (1879). 
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actions in the nervous system can best be regarded as purely physical.
9
  Lewes insists 
that they are not different in kind from what are normally regarded as mental events, 
since they, too, involve feeling, which Lewes refers to variously as ‘Sensibility’ and 
‘sentience’ (III, 220), even if the individual is not aware of this.10 Though the extract 
quoted does not deal directly with the question of reflex actions, therefore, it needs to 
be understood as part of a wider theory which thoroughly integrates the mental and 
the physical as radically distinct but also inseparable, and which rejects the distinction 
between any purely physical, or mental, events. Lewes also, moreover, insists on the 
fundamental role played by the social sphere in shaping minds. ‘Social Forms, 
scientific theories, works of Art, and, above all, Language’, he writes, are ‘incessantly 
acting’ on each subject (IV, 166), with the result that ‘our mental furniture shows the 
bric à brac of prejudice beside the fashion of the hour; our opinions are made up of 
shadowy associations, imperfect memories, echoes of other men's voices, mingling 
with the reactions of our own sensibility’ (IV, 167). The mind’s fluid variations, then, 
are inseparable from the life of the body, and are equally inseparable from the 
complex, perhaps chaotic, relations between the self and the social environment. 
 
A central implication of Lewes’s model is the self’s individuality. The 
presence of ‘sentience’ throughout the body means that, unlike a machine, it is able to 
respond adaptively to the demands placed on it by lived experience: ‘the sensitive 
mechanism’, Lewes writes, ‘is not a simple mechanism, and as such constant, but a 
                                                 
9
 T. H. Huxley, ‘On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and Its History’ [1874], in Methods 
and Results, 5
th
 reprint (London: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 199–250 (p. 205). Roger Smith argues 
persuasively that Huxley’s rhetorical bravado may convey the impression that his views were more 
stridently held than was really the case.  Nonetheless, the difference between Huxley’s view and 
Lewes’s is significant. See Roger Smith, Free Will and the Human Sciences in Britain, 1870-1910 
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013), p. 24. 
10
 Lewes uses ‘Sensibility’ to describe feeling in its subjective and physical aspects, and ‘sentience’ to 
refer to the subjective aspect only of feeling. See III, 220. 
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variable mechanism, which has a history’ (I, 162; original emphasis). That ‘history’ 
is, in part, the history of the species, which is passed on to the individual through 
heredity, but it is also an individual history, composed of that individual’s own 
experiences, which give a distinctive shape to the mind. This distinctiveness means 
that a subject processes information in necessarily individual ways: the mind is ‘not a 
passive recipient of external impressions’ but instead exerts influence as ‘an active co-
operant’ (I, 162) in perceiving those impressions.  
 
As this last quotation indicates, the mind’s particularity also produces 
meaningful, if limited, agency. While Huxley argues that ‘there is no proof that any 
state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the 
organism’ Lewes, though he shares Huxley’s view that the self is rooted in the body, 
nonetheless insists that ‘we have, within certain limits, a power of arresting and 
redirecting the action of our organs or the current of our thoughts’ and that ‘we can 
place ourselves under the tutelage of Experience, and so enlarge, and even alter, the 
primary tendencies, till what was once the immediate reflex of the [nervous] 
Mechanism becomes abhorrent’ (IV, 107).11 For Lewes, although all mental 
phenomena are ultimately caused rather than spontaneously arise, the particularity of 
each self, and the ability of consciousness to exert causal influence on the self, afford 
human beings some provisional freedom within the vast chain of cause and effect in 
which they live.
 
 
 
 Meredith’s novel shares psychological imagery with Lewes’s account but also 
shares his willingness to grapple with questions of the self’s individuality and active 
                                                 
11
 Huxley, ‘Automata’, p. 244. 
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capabilities. These features of Victorian psychological theory and of Meredith’s 
writing, I argue, deserve greater prominence in our understanding of both. Scholars in 
the field have instead often emphasized ways in which Meredith’s novel, and 
Victorian concepts of the self based in biological science, call into question the very 
notion of discrete, still less autonomous, selfhood. Nicholas Dames’ illuminating 
study of Victorian fiction and physiological models of reading, for instance, 
concentrates on ways in which Lewes’s work can be seen as part of a wider tendency, 
among Victorian theories of mind, to see the self as a mechanism and as part of a 
wider material and cultural system, but pays much less attention to Lewes’s equally 
strong interest in the self’s individuation and potential agency.12 Reading The Egoist, 
Dames touches on the possibilities of personal agency by noting that characters’ 
perceptual acts may be ‘liberatory’, but grounds his account of Meredith’s 
representations of such acts in the concept of ‘psychophysics’, which understands 
perception as composed of small, ‘isolated bits’ of information impacting on the self 
in a regularized, non-individuated, way.
13
 The emphasis of Dames’s discussion is thus 
on ways in which Meredith presents selves as fragmented, since they are in part made 
up of these ‘isolated bits’, and as fundamentally shaped by common psychological 
processes, and much less on how Meredith also presents characters, even so, as 
separate wholes. Martha A. Turner offers a related argument, contending that The 
Egoist shares with Victorian science ‘the mechanistic goal of laying bare the rules or 
principles that dictate events and appearances’, and that Meredith’s narrative 
demonstrates ‘the essential regularity and comprehensibility of the protagonists’ 
eccentric actions’, emphasizing common physiological and psychological events and 
                                                 
12
 See Nicholas Dames, The Physiology of the Novel: Reading, Neural Science, and the Form of 
Victorian Fiction (Oxford University Press, 2007), especially pp. 60, 64. 
13
 Dames, pp. 203, 175, 174. 
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processes above the self’s individuation.14 In the broader field of scholarship on 
Victorian representations of the self, William Cohen’s influential Embodied reads 
Victorian texts via late-twentieth-century theories of the body and the senses, and 
takes a similarly sceptical approach to notions of the self as discrete and autonomous: 
for Cohen, the Victorian ‘embodied subject’ ‘is not ethereal, transcendent or fixed, in 
either form or identity, but rather palpable, porous and motile.’15 These arguments all 
rightly point to the ways in which Victorian representations of mind radically question 
notions of an unproblematically unified self. Yet to attend to Meredith’s use of 
metaphors of fluidity is to foreground instead the mind’s more active and individuated 
possibilities, which, for Meredith and for a psychologist such as Lewes, remain just as 
worthy of attention as the many non-individuated physiological and psychological 
features shared by all minds.
16
  The central part played by images of fluid mental 
dynamics in The Egoist’s representations of mind confirm that Clara’s and other 
selves may, indeed, be fragmented in the sense that their assumptions about 
themselves and others are radically challenged in the course of the narrative, and 
imply that individual selves cannot simply transcend common physiological and 
psychological factors. But that fluidity also implies non-mechanistic, individual 
particularity and capacity to act. 
 
Early in the novel, after her misgivings about Willoughby have been 
heightened by the revelation that it is the impoverished Vernon, and not Willoughby, 
                                                 
14
 Turner, p. 117.  
15
 William Cohen, Embodied: Victorian Literature and the Senses (University of Minnesota Press, 
2009), p. xvi. 
16
 A major exception to the relative neglect of the concept of agency is Rylance’s seminal study, which 
includes a superb extended discussion of Lewes’s theory of mind, and convincingly addresses concepts 
of individuation and autonomy. See especially Rylance, pp. 283-85.  
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who is supporting Crossjay financially, Clara’s sense of her changing feelings is 
experienced as a disconcerting inner flux: 
 
She walked back at a slow pace, and sung to herself above her darker-flowing 
thoughts, like the reed-warbler on the branch beside the night-stream; a simple 
song of light-hearted sound, independent of the shifting black and grey of the 
flood underneath.
17
  
 
Later, as her doubts about the suitability of Willoughby as a husband continue to 
grow, she pleads a headache and retires to her room, pondering anxiously on the 
likely reactions to this of Vernon, Horace and Willoughby. She attempts to distract 
herself with a saccharine vision of life at the Hall as a pastoral idyll, sympathy with 
which assures her of her ‘goodness’, even as she in fact contemplates her escape.    
Her sense of turmoil about her relationship with her fiancé is stronger than ever: 
 
And she had the love of wild flowers, the watchful happiness in the seasons; 
poets thrilled her, books absorbed. She dwelt strongly on that sincerity of 
feeling; it gave her root in our earth; she needed it as she pressed a hand on her 
eyeballs, conscious of acting the invalid, though the reasons she had for 
languishing under headache were so convincing that her brain refused to 
disbelieve in it and went some way to produce positive throbs. Otherwise she 
had no excuse for shutting herself in her room. Vernon Whitford would be 
sceptical. Headache or none, Colonel De Craye must be thinking strangely of 
her; she had not shown him any sign of illness. His laughter and his talk sung 
                                                 
17
 George Meredith, The Egoist [1879], ed. by George Woodcock (London: Penguin, 1968), p.108.  
Subsequent references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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about her and dispersed the fiction; he was the very sea-wind for bracing 
unstrung nerves. Her ideas reverted to Sir Willoughby, and at once they had 
no more cohesion than the foam on a torrent-water. (p. 229) 
 
In a description of an internal dynamic similar to that which Lewes outlines, Clara 
sings to herself ‘above her darker-flowing thoughts’, an image redolent at once of 
emotional and bodily energies, and which thus, as in Lewes’s account, points to the 
self’s inseparability from physical being. These may or may not form part of her 
explicit consciousness at this moment, but they are at least partially perceptible as 
‘thoughts’. This is one of many moments at which Meredith raises the fundamental 
problem of self-knowledge, a problem which takes on a vividness and urgency as it is 
explored not in psychological theory but in a specific character’s mind and social 
context, in which gender and class ideologies threaten to obliterate what little self-
awareness Clara has. That sense of urgency is heightened in the extension, though it is 
modest in comparison with others in the novel, of the figure of the stream, to suggest 
that Clara’s efforts to avoid understanding her situation may be as diminutive and 
fragile as the ‘reed-warbler’, and that such understanding itself is emotionally 
threatening. It is heightened, too, in the contrast between the relative bleakness of 
such imagery and the narrative’s predominantly comic tone and the action’s idyllic 
setting. That contrast registers the isolation and limited scope of Clara’s view even as 
the narrator foregrounds her subjective experience and confirms its centrality in the 
narrative. But, as in Lewes’s account of different levels of consciousness which are 
simultaneously present in the mind, Clara’s ‘thoughts’ are more than simply an 
intimation that her self-knowledge is incomplete. They constitute other possible 
shapes and directions, present on the margins of her awareness, which her 
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consciousness might take, and which are as much part of herself as the content of her 
immediate awareness. In Clara’s case these possibilities cannot yet fully be 
acknowledged and thus bring about an act of conscious volition such as Lewes points 
to in his account. Nonetheless, the fluidity and individuality of her mind - in Lewes’s 
terms a ‘variable mechanism’ at once physical and mental and able to adapt according 
to complex lived experience - open up the potential for her freeing herself from her 
current situation. Her mind retains a degree of particularity, and with this possible 
autonomy, despite the weight of ideological norms which play on her, and 
notwithstanding her very limited insight, at this stage, into her own feelings.  
 
In the second extract, the problem of self-knowledge is again to the fore. Clara 
is seemingly unable to distinguish ‘sincerity of feeling’ from her rather trite appeals to 
the beauty of ‘wild flowers’, ‘the seasons’ and ‘poets’, and is ‘conscious of acting the 
invalid’ yet also experiencing at least some physical symptoms. Clara’s thoughts 
about Willoughby are almost without ‘cohesion’ and characterized, instead, by the 
rapid flow of ‘a torrent-water’, and this suggests, once again, an unnerving sense of 
instability in her conscious life and yet also the potential liberation of a transformed 
consciousness. There is a kind of fluidity about Clara’s actually articulable thoughts, 
too, which means that these seem equally lacking in ‘cohesion’. In an example of the 
impact of ‘echoes of other men's voices’ to which Lewes refers, Clara’s consciousness 
is momentarily but powerfully invaded by the idea of Horace as ‘the very sea-wind 
for bracing unstrung nerves’, a phrase which seems redolent of his own speech, either 
literally heard or remembered. While his influence over her eventually proves to be 
considerably weaker than he imagines, an instance such as this nonetheless points to 
the constant permeability, in Meredith’s narrative, of individual consciousness to 
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other voices and, potentially, to coercive ideological codes.
18
 As in Lewes’s image of 
the stream of consciousness, explicitly conscious thoughts, such permeability 
suggests, may be just as readily transformable as the ‘flows’ of remoter consciousness 
or the subconscious.  
 
The fluidity of Clara’s mind, which produces her particularity, therefore 
carries a range of implications. In the first extract, it is the source of potentially 
liberating personal agency but also a reminder of the sheer difficulty of attaining 
sufficient self-knowledge to realize that agency. The second example again points to 
the liberatory potential of consciousness as it is re-shaped by the subconscious, but 
also the vulnerability to oppressive external influence which the self’s fluidity carries 
with it. Both instances illustrate the potential, but also the precariousness, of 
individual agency, and the sheer difficulty of this problem for Clara as she looks for a 
way out of her predicament. She thus exemplifies the unpredictable role of individual 
selves in Meredith’s vision, set out in the ‘Essay’, of social progress driven by a freer 
gender politics. Her inner unrest hints at the possibility of autonomous action which, 
eventually, produces narrative closure and gestures towards greater freedom from 
conventional notions of gender for Meredith’s readers, too. Yet the very plasticity of 
her selfhood leaves her constantly open to her own evasive denials of self-knowledge 
and to countervailing discourses which threaten to obliterate her efforts at asserting 
herself, and thus implies that it is impossible to understand her, or any other self, as 
part of a straightforwardly progressivist narrative.  
 
                                                 
18
 For a detailed and alert reading of Meredith through Bakhtin’s concept of heteroglossia, see Neil 
Roberts, Meredith the Novelist (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997). 
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Elsewhere in the text, descriptions of the self’s hidden energies invoke a 
different kind of flow, that of electricity. As in his use of the stream metaphor, 
Meredith deploys such electrical images, which are another staple of Victorian 
psychological writing, to point specifically to the self’s potential for liberating 
personal choice - in Clara’s case, to describe the emergence of hitherto non-conscious 
thoughts which disturb her consciousness and gesture towards the possibility of 
escape from Willoughby. Vernon Whitford, who is falling in love with Clara, 
exchanges views with Laetitia Dale, who eventually marries Willoughby, about the 
couple’s relationship; he remarks that ‘we never can tell the person quite suited to us; 
it strikes us in a flash’. To this, Laetitia responds that getting to know another person 
occurs ‘by degrees’ (p. 222), and not as a sudden moment of revelation, but Vernon’s 
elaboration of his point implies that both descriptions of the mind’s coming to 
knowledge may be true at the same time: ‘Yes, but the accumulation of evidence, or 
sentience, if you like, is combustible; we don’t command the spark; it may be late in 
falling’ (p. 222). Clara, that is, already knows that she does not love Willoughby 
without being fully conscious that she knows it. A little later in the narrative, when 
Clara considers more explicitly the ‘evidence’ against Willoughby, she experiences 
just such a ‘flash’ of insight: 
 
She reviewed him. It was all in one flash. It was not much less intentionally 
favourable than the world’s review and that of his friends, but, beginning with 
the idea of them, she recollected – heard Willoughby’s voice pronouncing his 
opinion of his friends and the world; of Vernon Whitford and Colonel De 
Craye for example, and of men and women. (p. 251)  
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These references to a ‘flash’ and ‘spark’ echo the theory of ‘unconscious 
cerebration’.19 A leading exponent of the concept, William Carpenter, observes that:  
 
when we have been trying to recollect […] some name, phrase, occurrence, 
&c., […] it will often occur spontaneously a little while afterwards, suddenly 
flashing (as it were) into our consciousness, either when we are thinking of 
something altogether different, or on awaking out of profound sleep.
20
  
 
Carpenter also describes an unconscious mental process as an incomplete ‘“circuit of 
thought”’ which ‘may remain for a long time without being “closed.”’21 There is no 
evidence that Meredith read Carpenter, but the concept of unconscious cerebration 
was referred to by a range of other theorists of mind in the period, including Lewes. 
Lewes describes his own example: we remember the first letter of a name but not the 
rest of it, and the unconscious mind strives to piece together the remaining letters until 
‘suddenly after hours, perhaps days, the name flashes upon the mind’ (V, 129). The 
‘flash’ of realisation to which Vernon refers, similarly, is not an isolated event but 
instead the product of an ‘accumulation’ of data already present in the mind, the 
mobilisation of which enables new understanding. Meredith’s elaboration of the 
metaphors of ‘flash’ and ‘spark’, which ignite ‘combustible’ material in the mind, 
points to the socially subversive potential of this mobilisation of hidden mental 
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processes.
22
 It is striking that Vernon equates ‘evidence’ with ‘sentience’, the latter 
word, as we have seen, a key term for Lewes in his account of the mind/body 
relationship; this points once again to Meredith’s and Lewes’s shared sense of the 
mind’s inseparability from the sensory experience of the body as a whole.  
 
Meredith’s uses of the metaphor, however, highlight the uncertainty of result 
attending subconscious mental processes in the context of individual minds struggling 
towards self-knowledge and knowledge of others, and towards the liberation these 
might bring. Laetitia’s remark that we ‘don’t command the spark’ emphasizes the 
seeming chanciness of moments of insight. Clara’s ‘flash’ of realization about 
Willoughby is immediately complicated by the vaguely-sensed presence of her own, 
perhaps biased, intention and by the comparison of her ‘review’ of Willoughby - the 
term itself connotes an artificial reconstruction of him in her mind as much as a 
spontaneous perception – with the reviews of other characters, which may confirm or 
undermine her own. Moreover, Meredith’s development of connected metaphors in 
the same chapter emphasizes that Clara’s own ‘flash’ of awareness offers no 
automatically reliable guide for action, and thus no clear path to greater freedom. In 
the lines preceding that moment, we read that ‘the fire of a brain burning high and 
kindling everything lighted up herself against herself’, opening her to scrutiny by her 
‘incandescent reason’ (pp. 250, 251). But instead of the socially subversive 
combustibility which Vernon’s phrase suggests, Clara’s ‘fire’ leads her to try to 
quieten her doubts about Willoughby and to condemn herself as ‘volatile’ and 
‘feather-headed’ (p. 250). Some lines further on, she is in a state of mind in which 
‘the brain is rageing [sic] like a pine-torch and the devouring illumination leaves not a 
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spot of our nature covert’ (p. 251), but this merely produces further fruitless 
oscillation between her sense of her own ‘weakness’ and her ‘loathing’ for 
Willoughby. The extended metaphor of ‘fire’, moreover, is redolent of the 
psychological figure of the ‘flash’ but also expresses emotional and bodily distress as 
the ‘flash’ does not, and emphasizes that any moment of insight is necessarily 
embedded in the particular self who has it. Clara’s ‘flash’, then, expresses not just 
hidden knowledge, as in Lewes’s and Carpenter’s formulations, but also, crucially, 
the difficulty for a specific mind of identifying, much less daring to act on, that 
knowledge, and the punitive emotions that she may experience as a result.  
 
The contrasting possibilities of the mind’s active capabilities are in play, too, 
in specific moments of complex sensory perception which at the same time bring 
subconscious thoughts into play. Clara feels a ‘curiosity’ to know the title of the book 
that Vernon is reading, and is quickly overtaken by a heightened awareness which is 
unusual both for her and in the narrative itself: 
 
She turned her face to where the load of virginal blossom, whiter than 
summer-cloud on the sky, showered and drooped and clustered so thick as to 
claim colour and seem, like higher Alpine snows in noon-sunlight, a flush of 
white. From deep to deeper heavens of white, her eyes perched and soared. 
Wonder lived in her. Happiness in the beauty of the tree pressed to supplant it, 
and was more mortal and narrower. Reflection came, contracting her vision 
and weighing her to earth. Her reflection was: ‘He must be good who loves to 
lie and sleep beneath the branches of this tree!’ She would rather have clung to 
her first impression. (pp. 154-55) 
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This startling instance of aesthetic intensity, in a novel overwhelmingly centred on 
social comedy, is another point of confluence between Meredith’s representations of 
mind and contemporary psychological theory. In his 1878 essay ‘The Undefinable in 
Art’ Sully explores the psychology of aesthetic experience in terms of a fluid 
combination of conscious and subconscious elements which closely recalls Lewes’s 
‘stream’. When we look at a painting, for example, our enjoyment is composed of 
perceptions which are distinctly perceived and of others which are less so: 
 
When, for instance, we are deriving an intellectual satisfaction from some 
particular virgin-shape or gentle face, the many other pleasing elements of the 
picture contribute each a little rillet of undiscriminated emotion; and these 
obscure or ‘sub-conscious’ currents of feeling serve to swell the impression of 
any single instant, making it full and deep.
23
  
 
The aesthetic effect of any one aspect of the painting, Sully argues, is partly 
dependent on the many other perceptions of other parts of it, though these perceptions 
are for the moment outside explicit consciousness. This is a feature of aesthetic 
experience generally, and points to a fundamental capability that the mind possesses. 
In any such experience, Sully writes:  
 
We leave many sources of gratification undetected. The whole effect, further, 
seems to be something more than the sum of the separate elements, even 
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 James Sully, ‘The Undefinable in Art’, The Cornhill Magazine 38 (1878), 559-72 (p. 561). 
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supposing these to be ascertained […] In other words, the intermingling of 
these elements affects us differently from the elements experienced apart.
24
  
 
Sully points here to the limitations of consciousness, but also to its capaciousness and 
flexibility. He acknowledges that the mind cannot know all of its own operations, yet 
he also illustrates its ability to perceive a complex whole, such as a painting or 
landscape, at a single moment rather than as a series of isolated perceptions. For 
Sully, this exemplifies the mind’s role as an agent in its own right, able to combine 
and make sense of sensory data, rather than just passively receive those data. It is a 
discrete entity, capable of meaningful action, even while it also ultimately forms part 
of the wider determining physical universe. Like Lewes, Sully thus places a 
significantly stronger emphasis on individuality and agency than is the case in 
Huxley’s theory, despite the common basis in physiology which the three share.  
 
Clara’s perception of the many small blooms which make up the blossom as a 
single, whole ‘flush of white’ manifests, as in Sully’s account, her mind’s capacity 
actively to organize, rather than simply to receive, complex sensory information. At 
the same time, Clara’s mental experience proves more complex still - and 
disconcertingly so - since it is bound up with associated, vague but illicit perceptions 
of what Vernon is coming to mean to her. Such perceptions offer the possibility of 
resisting Willoughby’s stifling demands which, earlier in the scene, are described as a 
‘voracious aesthetic gluttony’ not only for rigidly-defined feminine ‘purity’ but also 
for the consistent and flawless ‘performance’ of that ‘purity’ (pp. 151, 150) as a social 
and ideological signifier. Hinting at possible freedom, however, Clara’s aesthetic 
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experience here also profoundly disturbs her view not just of Vernon and Willoughby 
but of herself.  
 
The ensuing mental processing of such a dangerous perception  highlights 
once again that the self’s plasticity also brings with it vulnerability to coercive social 
codes and the capacity to evade self-awareness, as much as it offers the prospect of 
autonomy. Clara’s subversive perceptual act is duly rationalized, and hence reduced 
in its disruptive force, as happiness at the beauty of the tree and then as the relatively 
uncontroversial, explicit ‘reflection’ on Vernon. Meredith’s constant juxtaposition of 
competing narrative focalizations, moreover, means that his readers are seldom 
without a sense of ironic distance from any character’s perspective, and there is 
perhaps a hint of irony even in this moment of inspiration, given the limited scope, 
and frequent conventionality, of Clara’s mental life. Superficially resembling a 
moment of enlightenment in a Bildungsroman, Clara’s experience here offers nothing 
so momentous: it is a powerful and potentially liberating moment of perception, but it 
is only a perception, and the description of it is hedged round with a strong sense of 
her narrow subjectivity. As Anna Maria Jones has argued, Meredith’s novel 
challenges readers to resist the temptation to see Clara’s story in terms of a romantic 
plot with an inevitable movement towards resolution.
25
 Likewise, in the wider context 
of the novel’s vision of possible liberating social change, Meredith takes up a model 
of mental activity, which recalls Sully’s, to highlight the crucial importance of 
individual, dynamic minds, such as Clara’s, as they engage with the world and 
question conventional gender politics, but also manifests the painful slowness of any 
such change and the uncertain part that any one self may play in it.  
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A similarly complex perceptual act, which again exemplifies the uncertain 
movement of Clara’s mind towards freeing herself, occurs when Clara contemplates 
the emptied glass of brandy and water which she has shared with Vernon at the station 
after her abortive attempt to escape. With none of the aesthetic appeal of the blossom, 
it nonetheless triggers intricate mental processes: 
 
Vernon had asked her whether she was alone. Connecting that inquiry, 
singular in itself, and singular in his manner of putting it, with the glass of 
burning liquid, she repeated: ‘He must have seen Colonel De Craye!’ and she 
stared at the empty glass, as at something that witnessed to something […] But 
all the doors are not open in a young lady’s consciousness, quick of nature 
though she may be: some are locked and keyless, some will not open to the 
key, some are defended by ghosts inside. She could not have said what the 
something witnessed to […] And the smell of the glass was odious; it 
disgraced her. She had an impulse to pocket the spoon for a memento, to show 
it to grandchildren for a warning. Even the prelude to the morality to be 
uttered on the occasion sprang to her lips […] the conclusion was hazy, like 
the conception; she had her idea. (p. 335) 
 
The metaphor of the unopened ‘doors’, Meredith’s own, focuses attention on Clara’s 
consciousness as incomplete, characterized by gaps or dead ends which are 
necessitated by the ideological pressures on her not to know too much about her own 
desires. The ‘ghosts’ which defend some of the doors recall the ‘shadow of the male 
Egoist’ which, we have read earlier, overawes the ‘brains’ of young women (p. 153) 
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with narrowly prescriptive demands. The extension of the ‘doors’ metaphor, 
moreover, turns a mechanistic-sounding figure – of doors open or shut – which might 
describe a type such as ‘a young lady’, into something more individual and 
incalculable - doors to be opened in different ways and offering different kinds of 
barriers to accessing what is inside. The individuality which this implies, far from 
offering the possibility of autonomous action, instead underlines the particular, 
perhaps incalculable, ways in which individual minds may resist or evade awareness 
which cannot be admitted to consciousness. The incompleteness of Clara’s thoughts is 
then unsatisfactorily replaced by the pat moral object-lesson concerning the spoon 
which she envisages in an attempt to realign her consciousness with the role that is 
demanded of her.  
 
Nonetheless, the empty glass does more than uncover gaps in Clara’s 
conscious awareness: it is also the catalyst for ‘connecting’ events which have just 
occurred and brings Clara closer to the realisation of her and Vernon’s mutual 
feelings. That Clara becomes aware merely of ‘something that witnessed to 
something’ expresses the incompleteness of her thoughts, but it also, in another 
parallel with Sully, signals the ability of consciousness to embrace new and complex 
information in a single moment of perception, even if only partially at this stage. The 
‘conclusion’ and ‘conception’ of the moral tale, similarly, are ‘hazy’ in a way which 
points to their artificiality but also registers the more subversive significance, which 
Clara cannot yet directly acknowledge, of the spoon as an object associated with her 
relationship with Vernon. Once again, the plasticity of Clara’s mind points to the 
limited scope of her conscious knowledge of her own motives, and the difficulty with 
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which she is able to free herself, yet also opens up possibilities of personal agency and 
liberation and hence points towards potential wider social progress.  
 
II. Agency and Evolution 
 
Lewes’s and Sully’s emphasis on the inseparability of the mind from the body 
implies that evolution must play a crucial part in the physical and mental development 
of any self, yet their insistence that the self is individuated and has the potential for 
meaningful agency means that they firmly resist any reductively evolutionist 
psychology because this must be inadequate as a model of individual minds’ inner 
dynamics and relations with the world.
26
 Meredith’s critique of crude applications of 
evolutionary theory to human identity suggests further common ground with Lewes 
and Sully but, as has been pointed out by a number of commentators, is also bound up 
with his critique of conventional gender politics, since, as Willoughby’s evolutionary 
pronouncements show, evolutionary discourse may be readily appropriated to give 
quasi-scientific respectability to stiflingly patriarchal demands on Clara.
27
 
Nonetheless, questions of evolution’s relationship with identity remain crucial since, 
as John Holmes has argued in his discussion of Meredith’s sonnet sequence, Modern 
Love (1862), Meredith sees the full recognition of women’s part in biological 
evolution, which implies that they are physical, desiring beings, as necessary to a 
more enlightened understanding of gender which acknowledges the sexuality of both 
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sexes.
28
 Clara’s attempts to locate her identity in relation to evolution, in the sense of 
acknowledging and making her own sexual choice, are therefore crucial to her agency 
and status as a discrete individual. At the same time, her example shows, once again, 
that the self’s fluidity and individuation have varied and perhaps contradictory 
implications: they may enable individual choice but may also bring to the fore the 
precariousness of individual agency amid competing social, ideological and 
psychological pressures.  
Vernon, sure of the inevitability of Clara’s falling in love with Horace, tells 
Laetitia that ‘our modern word for it is Nature. Science condescends to speak of 
natural selection’ (p. 369). Yet a few moments before this he describes Clara’s 
dilemma as ‘a dispute between a conventional idea of obligation and an injury to her 
nature…It’s one of the few cases in which nature may be consulted like an oracle’ (p. 
368). This latter formulation suggests that there is, indeed, a ‘nature’ which Clara 
needs to connect with if she is to resist Willoughby’s entrapment and assert her own 
agency, and that that ‘nature’ must, in part, be biological.  But Vernon’s remark also 
exemplifies the contrasts, and potential slippage, of meaning between ‘nature’ as 
impersonal biological process, as bodily self, as essential character and, alternatively, 
as complex, developing individuality; no longer capitalised and reified, the term now 
takes on an uncertain meaning. Laetitia’s reply, ‘Is she so sure of her nature?’ (p. 
368), makes this point more forcefully.  
 
Shortly afterwards the difficulty of defining Clara’s ‘nature’, given her 
complex mental dynamics, becomes even more apparent: 
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She had but one answer: ‘Anything but marry him!’ It threw her on her nature, 
our last and headlong advocate, who is quick as the flood to hurry us from the 
heights to our level, and lower, if there be accidental gaps in the channel. For 
say we have been guilty of misconduct: can we redeem it by violating that 
which we are and live by? The question sinks us back to the luxuriousness of a 
sunny relinquishment of effort in the direction against tide. Our nature 
becomes ingenious in devices, penetrative of the enemy, confidently citing its 
cause for being frankly elfish or worse. (pp. 395-96) 
 
Her ‘nature’, psychological but also evolutionary, cries against the prospect of life 
with Willoughby and pushes Clara towards recognising her own desires, a recognition 
which might free her from him and from the patriarchal norms which he embodies. 
Yet that ‘nature’ proves to be definable rather in opposition to Willoughby’s sexual 
and ideological pressure than in its own right. Far from constituting any one essence, 
the extended comparison with the ‘flood’ implies, the self’s inward energies may take 
unpredictable directions, a fact which makes impossible the definition of the self in 
terms of any one ‘level’, whether moral or otherwise psychological. As ever, the self 
has the ability to become ‘ingenious in devices’ of self-justification and it must also 
exist in ongoing interaction with the social and ideological environment, and this 
emphasizes the variety of shapes which it may take in its life. Given that 
disconcerting variety, Clara’s attempt to listen to her own ‘nature’ is urgent, for her 
and for Meredith’s vision of a more equal gender politics, but also full of potential 
confusion. Her fluid self may be as likely simply to confirm her own self-indulgent 
egoism as it is to free her. That same potential for confusion is implied, elsewhere in 
the narrative, in Clara’s ‘hundred-voiced instinct of dislike within her’ (p. 493) 
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towards Willoughby. This may, indeed, be an ‘instinct’ which questions his 
evolutionary fitness as a mate, but it also arises, and is felt in the context of, a 
complex, ‘hundred-voiced’ self whose operations cannot be described in terms of a 
unitary instinct. That complexity subverts Willoughby’s crude evolutionism, which 
sees ‘woman’ as ‘having no passion of her own, but simply an instinct driving her to 
attach herself to whatsoever is most largely admired, most shining’ (p. 362). At the 
same time, the concept of ‘instinct’ points to the inseparability of mind and biology. 
Yet the ‘hundred-voiced’ self also implies the ever-present difficulty of disentangling 
instinct from the maze of more or less acknowledged motives, and interpersonal and 
ideological influences, which converge in that self, and which may produce what is 
apparently a clear instinctual prompting to action. Given such complication, for Clara 
even to identify what it is that she wants may be far from straightforward. 
 
The complex significance of the evolutionary in Clara’s selfhood is also in 
evidence much earlier in the novel in a moment which suggests another instance of 
Meredith’s creative use of psychological language in his exploration of personal 
agency and gender politics. Willoughby’s desire for complete mastery over Clara is 
disturbed by hints that her mental and bodily life may evade his control: 
 
She certainly had at times the look of the nymph that has gazed too long on the 
faun, and has unwittingly copied his lurking lip and long sliding eye. Her play 
with young Crossjay resembled a return of the lady to the cat; she flung herself 
into it as if her real vitality had been in suspense till she saw the boy. Sir 
Willoughby by no means disapproved of a physical liveliness that promised 
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him health in his mate; but he began to feel in their conversations that she did 
not sufficiently think of making herself a nest for him. (pp. 127-28) 
 
Willoughby’s suspicion here seems not to be focused on the possibility of actual 
sexual transgression by Clara. The comparison with the nymph and faun has grown 
out of Willoughby’s vague sense, in the previous paragraph, of her ‘innocent roguery, 
wildwood roguery’ (p. 127), and the perception merely that she has ‘unwittingly 
copied’ the facial expressions of the faun, and thus that her outward demeanour has 
momentarily failed to conform to the self-effacing modesty of his ideal wife, is 
enough to disconcert him. He is also disturbed, however, by Clara’s ‘real vitality’, 
which appears to be reserved for Crossjay and which thus seems to indicate aspects of 
her emotional life which lie outside Willoughby’s knowledge and control, despite his 
recourse to the (for him) reassuring evolutionist paradigm which sees her ‘physical 
liveliness’ as indicative simply of ‘health in his mate’. The subversive potential of 
Clara’s ‘vitality’ is highlighted if we compare it with Lewes’s use of the same concept 
as another important term in his theory of mind. Discussing the distinction between 
organisms and machines, which I touched on earlier, he writes: 
 
One cardinal difference is that the combination of the parts is in the machine a 
fixed, in the organism a fluctuating adjustment; and this fluctuation is due to 
certain vital processes subjectively known as sensitive guidance. Hence 
machines have fixed and calculated mechanisms; whereas organisms are 
variable and to a great extent incalculable mechanisms. (III, 365) 
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For Lewes it is the presence of ‘sensitive guidance’ or sentience, in organisms which 
means that they have a potential to develop not possessed by machines; here, his 
discussion refers to organic life in general, but, as we saw earlier, the same insistence 
on fluid adaptability by means of sentience informs Lewes’s theory of the human 
mind specifically. This distinctive feature of organic life implies that any process 
taking place in a living organism, even if that process seems simple, needs to be 
understood as ‘not physical’ as would be the case in a process carried out by a 
machine, but instead ‘vital’ (III, 366) since it takes place in a sentient and changing 
being. Vitality, therefore, entails an important element of individuality in the 
organism, and Lewes stresses this point in his stance towards Darwin’s theories. 
Applauding ‘that luminous hypothesis by which Mr. Darwin has revolutionised 
Zoology’ (III, 115) Lewes also, however, warns against reifying the abstract concept 
of species, or ‘Type’, as if it had a reality in itself. Instead, all individual organisms 
are, indeed, individual, and species offer only an approximate guide to the size, shape 
and relationship to the environment which each individual possesses. This is because 
each organism’s life is not the product of a rigidly defined blueprint, as the abstract 
notion of ‘Type’ might seem to imply, but rather develops through the ongoing 
interactions not just between heredity and environment but between these and the 
conditions within each organism taken as an individual. The organism, he writes, ‘is 
this particular organism, differing from others, because of the particular conditions 
[in the environment and in the organism itself] which have co-operated’ (III, 116). In 
Lewes’s view, the importance of attending to the particularity of the organism 
constitutes a significant caveat to Darwin’s primary focus on common conditions of 
heredity and environment.  
 
   31 
Meredith’s reference to Clara’s ‘vitality’ implies an analogous, and much 
more ideologically challenging, qualification to Willoughby’s evolutionist 
assumptions: it is necessarily bodily and may, indeed, indicate her health and potential 
suitability as a ‘mate’ likely to bear offspring successfully, yet it is also discrete and 
specific to Clara. It denies Willoughby’s attempts to superimpose on it his crude 
evolutionary beliefs, which try to subsume her subjectivity into the familial and social 
structure of Patterne Hall, and instead suggests that Clara is a biological organism 
who is also, however, individuated and capable of autonomous action. Clara’s 
‘vitality’ contrasts sharply with the ‘vital essence’ (p. 119) which, in the previous 
chapter, Laetitia detects in Willoughby; that phrase serves precisely to confirm his 
place in the existing social structure because it celebrates his physical being as the 
embodiment of his patriarchal, economic and hereditary power. The inseparability of 
Willoughby’s ‘vital’ existence from his overwhelming need for control and prestige is 
confirmed later in the narrative when we read that ‘the world’s view of him’, 
especially when he is threatened with the humiliation of being jilted a second time, is 
‘partly his vital breath, his view of himself’ (p. 449), the moderating ‘partly’ giving 
way to an extreme image in which his very bodily existence seems conflated with his 
perception of his own social standing. Clara’s vitality, by contrast, points to the 
separateness of her subjectivity, and also hints at her sexuality, both of which 
undermine Willoughby’s evolutionary theorising and his wider attempts to control 
her. At the same time, however, Clara’s individuality, which resists definition 
according to Willoughby’s biological scheme, can, precisely because it is individual, 
offer no certain source of liberating action and hence of possible wider social 
progress. The potential subversiveness of her vitality is real enough, but that vitality is 
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just one aspect of Clara’s wider selfhood, which remains conflicted and open to 
manifold psychological and ideological influences.  
 
Meredith, I have been arguing, is at once highly sceptical about the powers of 
human agency and yet also insistent on its importance in freer gender politics and 
social progress. His elaborations of psychological metaphors describe a complexity in 
mental dynamics which at times promises individual independence in the face of 
ideological pressures dramatized in the text, and at others suggests the self’s 
vulnerability to, and complicity with, those pressures. In the novel’s engagement with 
questions of human evolution, the dynamic self’s contrasting possibilities offer, on the 
one hand, a source of resistance to reductively-used Darwinian discourse and an 
impetus to redefine the self’s relationship with biology and, on the other, confusion, 
borne of the self’s very complexity, about what that relationship may be. Meredith’s 
idiosyncratic rendering of mental dynamics in particular, concretely-realized 
characters, and in the context of his critique of gender norms, is an example of what 
Roger Smith has convincingly argued is the distinctive contribution of the Victorian 
novel to the development of complex models of the self in the period.
29
 But the shared 
metaphors in Meredith’s novel and Lewes’s and Sully’s work also underline the 
importance of the concept of agency to Victorian psychological discourse more 
generally, and exemplify the saliency of that discourse, and of debates about agency, 
to questions about human beings’ relationship with evolution. It might be speculated 
that the continued influence of twentieth-century critical theory, with its radical 
questioning of the notion of the discrete individual and concomitant focus on social 
and discursive systems instead, has meant that the concept of agency has been less 
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central than it deserves to be in scholarly work on the self in Victorian culture. If so, a 
renewed sense of the Victorians’ complex engagement with notions of the self as 
active being, an engagement limited neither by the classic humanist notion of the 
unified self nor by the throughgoing scepticism, of later critical theory, about human 
agency, may be one way forward now.  
 
 
